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Connected Stocks
Abstract
By connecting stocks through common active mutual fund ownership, we forecast
cross-sectional variation in return covariance, controlling for similarity in style (in-
dustry, size, value, and momentum), the extent of common analyst coverage, and
other pair characteristics. We argue this covariance is due to contagion based on re-
turn decomposition evidence, cross-sectional heterogeneity in the extent of the e¤ect,
and the magnitude of average abnormal returns to a cross-stock reversal trading strat-
egy exploiting information in these connections. We show that the typical long/short
hedge fund covaries negatively with this strategy suggesting that hedge funds may
potentially exacerbate the price dislocation we document.
JEL classication: G12, G14
1 Introduction
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) have argued
that institutional features may play an important role in the movement of stocks
discount rates, causing returns to comove above and beyond that implied by their
fundamentals. In this paper we propose a new way to document that type of institu-
tional comovement. Specically, we forecast the o¤-diagonal elements of the rm-level
covariance matrix using measures of institutional connectedness. By measuring insti-
tutional comovement in such a bottoms-up fashion, we can more precisely measure the
covariation linked to institutional features. We focus on connecting stocks through
active fund ownership, as that institution not only may reect existing patterns in
covariation but may layer on additional covariation as well. In particular, we study
how common ownership of two stocks by an active fund manager can forecast the
pair-wise covariation of those stocks, controlling for various other characteristics of
the pair.
We nd that active fund connectedness predicts higher covariance, controlling for
similarity along the dimensions of industry, size, book-to-market ratio, and momen-
tum as well as the extent to which a pair of stocks are connected through common
analyst coverage. The predictive e¤ect is both statistically and economically quite
signicant. This nding continues to hold after controlling for a wide variety of other
pair characteristics in addition to these standard style controls.
We provide evidence consistent with common ownership causing the increased
covariation associated with ownership. First, a decomposition of the covariation into
cash-ow and discount-rate news components reveals that much of the aforementioned
patterns are due to the interaction between the cash-ow news of one stock in the pair
and the discount-rate news of the other stock in the pair. Interestingly, the ability
of common analyst coverage to predict cross-sectional variation in comovement is
primarily due to the covariance of cash-ow news with cash-ow news, in strong
contrast to the ownership results. Second, common ownership has a stronger e¤ect
on subsequent covariation when the stocks in the pair are small and/or the common
owners are experiencing either strong inows or outows.
Previous and current research looks at related questions: Is there information in
institutional holdings about future returns? Or more particularly, does variation in
assets under management result in price pressure? Most of these studies are con-
cerned with cross-sectional and time series predictability of abnormal returns. Any
1
implications for comovement are secondary, if examined at all. We begin by mea-
suring comovement and then we turn to the implications for predictability of returns
at the end of the analysis. In particular, we measure a stocks connected return and
show that this connected return predicts cross-sectional variation in average returns.
Specically, we dene the connected return for a particular stock as the return on a
portfolio consisting of all the stocks in our sample which are connected to a particular
stock through common ownership.
We document that trading strategies using the return on a stocks connected
portfolio as a conrming signal for a short-term, cross-stock reversal e¤ect generate
signicant abnormal returns up to 7% per year, controlling for market, size, value,
momentum, and the own-stock, short-term reversal factors. This evidence we provide
is again consistent with ownership-based connections causing the comovement.
Finally, we use our connected return strategy to explain hedge fund index returns
in standard performance attribution regressions. We show that the typical hedge
fund and in particular the typical long-short hedge fund load negatively on our trading
strategy. In fact, the exposure of these value-weight hedge fund indexes are more
negative than the sensitivity to our strategy of a value-weight portfolio of the active
mutual funds in our sample. This suggests that the typical hedge fund may be part
of the problem (creating the covariance) instead of part of the solution.2
Our work builds on a growing literature. It is now well known that there is a
relation between mutual fund ows and past performance (Ippolito (1992), Chevalier
and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998)). A recent paper by Coval and Sta¤ord
(2007) documents that extreme ows result in forced trading that temporarily moves
prices away from fundamental value as in the general asset re sales model of Shleifer
and Vishney (1992) through the price pressure mechanism of Scholes (1972). Ellul,
Jotikasthira, and Lundblad (2010) and Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) docu-
ment broadly similar ndings in the bond and convertible bond markets respectively.
Unlike these papers which study particular events, our analysis explores the extent
to which institutional connections a¤ect second moments more generally.
Recent theoretical work has emphasized the importance of delegated portfolio
management and agency frictions to price movements such as these.3 In particular,
2Consistent with this conclusion, Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2009) argue that hedge
funds consume rather than provide liquidity.
3See, for example, Darrell Du¢ es 2010 AFA presidential address.
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Vayanos and Woolley (2008) show how fund ows can generate comovement and
lead-lag e¤ects of the type we document. Their model provides strong theoretical
motivation for our empirical analysis. More generally, beginning with Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), researchers have studied the role of funding in arbitrage activity and
the extent to which arbitrageurs should be expected to demand or provide liquidity.4
On a related issue, Sadka (2009) shows that the typical hedge fund loads on a liquidity
risk factor and that sensitivity to that liquidity risk is priced in the cross section of
hedge fund returns. Measuring the extent to which hedge fundsperformance can
be attributed to a trading strategy that exploits temporary price dislocations due
to institutional-driven comovement follows naturally from that theory and empirical
evidence.
Four recent working papers analyze issues related to stock return comovement
and/or institutional ownership. Lou (2009) shows that ow-driven demand shocks
more generally a¤ect prices than just in the extreme re-sale situations of Coval and
Sta¤ord and that in fact that mechanism goes a long way to explaining mutual fund
performance persistence, the smart money e¤ect, and price momentum among large-
cap stocks. Unlike Lou (or Coval and Sta¤ord for that matter), we avoid having to
measuring the impact of ows on stock returns and instead use the actual connected
return as a signal of the strength of the contagion e¤ect resulting from ownership-
based connections in the stock market. Moreover, whereas Lous focus is on mo-
mentum e¤ects, we instead examine how the presence of institutional connectedness
interacts with the short-term reversal e¤ect found in stock returns.
Sun (2008) uses standard clustering techniques to identify subsets of funds that
hold similar stocks. Sun shows that the typical stocks return covaries with the
equal-weight average return on all of the stocks in the top ve fund clusters holding
the stock in question. Moreover, Sun shows that this covariance is stronger if the
average ow for the top ve clusters in question is lower than the tenth percentile
of the historical distribution of fund ows for that group of ve fund clusters. In
contrast, our approach models the pair-specic covariation as a function of the number
of common funds holding the stock, controlling for style e¤ects. Additionally, Sun
does not examine any implications of the covariance she documents for protable
trading strategies.
4Many researchers have built on the ideas in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), including Gromb and
Vayanos (2002), Vayanos (2004), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). For a recent survey of
this literature, see Gromb and Vayanos (2010).
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Chen, Chen, and Li (2009) study the determinants of cross-sectional variation in
pair-wise correlations and show that a large portion of that cross-sectional variation
is persistent, yet unexplained by a long list of variables. They do not use the degree
of active fund ownership to connect stocks. Like us, Chen, Chen, and Li develop a
trading strategy that uses the return on the portfolio of stocks that comove with the
stock in question. However, their trading strategy is a momentum strategy buy
(sell) stocks that have a high (low) comovers return. In contrast, our strategy is a
contrarian one sell (buy) stocks that have a high (low) connected portfolio return.
A paper written subsequent to our work that builds on our analysis is Greenwood
and Thesmar (2009). Greenwood and Thesmar point out that owners of stocks
can have correlated trading needs and thus the stocks that they hold can comove,
even if there are no overlapping holdings. Greenwood and Thesmar show that these
correlated trading needs predict future price volatility and cross-sectional variation
in comovement.
Chen, Hanson, Hong, and Stein (2008) explore whether hedge funds take advan-
tage of the mutual fund ow-forced trading that Coval and Sta¤ord document. They
argue that hedge funds take advantage of that opportunity as average returns of long-
short hedge funds are higher in months when the number of mutual funds in distress
is large. In particular, Chen, Hanson, Hong, and Stein suggest that this evidence
is consistent with hedge funds front-running the trades of distressed mutual funds.
Our ndings are consistent with their results but further show that the typical hedge
fund apparently winds up on the wrong side of the price dislocation that we study.
In summary, we show that understanding connectedness is a simple way to identify
institutional-based stock comovement and its link to short-term reversal patterns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize our
methodology and data sources. In Section 3, we describe our results. Section 4
concludes.
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2 Methodology
2.1 Measuring Commonality
We measure the amount of comovement in each pair that can be described by com-
monality in active mutual funds and equity analysts. At each quarter-end, we measure
the number of funds (Fij;t) that held both stocks i and j in their portfolios. As recent
work by Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2009) suggests that analyst recommendations fa-
cilitate herding by mutual fund managers, we create similar measures of common
analyst coverage. Specically, we measure the number of analysts (Aij;t) that issued
at least one earnings forecast for both stocks i and j during the twelve month pe-
riod preceding t. We use annual forecasts for our measure of common coverage as
quarterly earnings forecasts are not issued as consistently. For each cross section, we
calculate the normalized (to have unit standard deviation) rank transform of Fi;j and
Ai;j which we denote as F ij;t and A

ij;t.
2.2 Modeling Cross-Sectional Variation in Comovement
To measure how commonality is linked to comovement, we estimate cross-sectional
regressions forecasting subsequent cross-products of monthly returns for each pair of
stocks. We initially forecast cross products of returns rather than cross products of
unexpected returns because means are di¢ cult to measure (Merton (1980)).
Our goal is to determine whether institutional connectedness contributes to a
benchmark forecast of second moments. This is because one might expect that
covariation, whether due to fundamentals or not, can be linked to the characteristics
of the two rms in a pair. The prototypical example is industry classication; we
expect rms in similar industries to covary more, all else equal. To capture that
similarity, we measure industry similarity as the number of consecutive SIC digits
that are equal for a given pair, NUM_SIC.
In addition to industry similarity, we use three characteristics that help explain dif-
ferences in the cross-section of returns, namely, size, book-to-market, and momentum.
Previous research by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) has documented
the link between these characteristics and common return factors. Therefore, we
expect higher correlation between two stocks if they have a higher similarity in the
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characteristics mentioned above. To measure this similarity, each quarter we rst
calculate every stocks percentile ranking on a particular rm characteristic. Our
measures of similarity, SAME_SIZE, SAME_BEME, and SAME_MOM , are
then just the negative of the absolute di¤erence in percentile ranking across a pair for
a particular characteristic. As with our institutional connectedness measures, we do
not use these variables directly but instead work with normalized rank transforms,
which we continue to denote with an asterisk superscript. As institutional ownership
is correlated with size, we also create very general size controls based on the normal-
ized rank transform of the percentile market capitalization of the two stocks, SIZE1
and SIZE2 (where we label the larger stock in the pair as the rst stock), and the
interaction between the two market capitalization percentile rankings.
The benchmark forecasting cross-sectional regression that we estimate is therefore
the following:
ri;t+1rj;t+1 = a+ bf  F ij;t + ba  Aij;t + bs  SAME_SIZEij;t (1)
+bb  SAME_BEMEij;t + bm  SAME_MOMij;t + bk NUM_SICij;t
+bs1  SIZE1ij;t + bs2  SIZE2ij;t + bs12  SIZE1SIZE2ij;t + "ij;t.
The dependent variable is the cross-product of returns at time t+1, updated monthly.
The terms on the right hand side are measured at t and are all updated quarterly.
We also estimate an alternative specication:
ri;t+1rj;t+1 = a+ bf  F ij;t + ba  Aij;t (2)
+
9X
s=0
bs DDIFF_SIZEij;t=s +
9X
b=0
bb DDIFF_BEMEij;t=b
+
9X
m=0
bm DDIFF_MOMij;t=m +
3X
k=0
bk DNUM_SICij;t=k
+bs1  SIZE1ij;t + bs2  SIZE2ij;t + bs12  SIZE1SIZE2ij;t + "ij;t.
In this version of the regression, our control variables for a pairs di¤erence in
location across size, book-to-market, and momentum deciles as well as similarity in
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SIC code at the rst, second, third, and fourth digit are allowed to come in through
a simple but exible dummy-variable specication.
In both cases, we estimate these coe¢ cients using the approach of Fama and
McBeth (1973). All independent variables are cross-sectionally demeaned as well
as normalized to have unit standard deviation so that the intercept a measures the
average cross-sectional e¤ect and the regression coe¢ cients are easily interpreted. We
calculate Newey-West standard errors of the Fama-MacBeth estimates that take into
account autocorrelation in the cross-sectional slopes out to four lags.
2.3 Data and Sample
Stock returns come from the monthly le in CRSP. We use common stocks (share
codes 10 and 11) from NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ whose market capitalization
is above the NYSE median market cap. We choose this screening criteria because
common ownership by active managers and common coverage by analysts is not per-
vasive: small stocks, especially in the beginning of the sample, have little institutional
ownership in general. Limiting the data in this way also keeps the sample relatively
homogeneous.
The data on mutual fund holdings come from the merge between the CDA/Spectrum
database provided by Thomson Reuters and the CRSP Mutual Fund database. We
use the Mutual Fund Links dataset created by Russ Wermers and o¤ered by Wharton
Research Data Services. As our focus is on US active mutual funds, we remove index,
tax-managed funds and international funds by applying standard screening criteria
used in the literature.5 In addition, for a fund to be in our sample we require it to
hold at least one stock in our stock sample at a point in time.
We obtain data on analysts from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S)
database. At each point in time, we observe the stocks covered by each analyst
through the earnings forecasts that they issue. For an analyst to be in our sample, we
require that he or she follow at least one of the stocks in our stock sample by issuing
a one-year earnings forecast (the most common forecast issued by an analyst).
Our sample covers the period 1983 to 2007. Table 1 conrms the well-known
marked increase in funds over this period. The number of analysts has also increased,
5We specically follow the algorithm described in Cremers and Petajisto (2009).
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though not as dramatically. Table 2 reports estimates of aggregate and rm-level
VARs. These estimates allow us to decompose returns into their cash-ow news
and discount-rate news components using the approach of Campbell (1991). We
summarize his method and the particular VAR specications that we use to implement
his technique in the Appendix. Table 3 reports various summary statistics for returns
and the news components. Consistent with Vuolteenaho (2002), cash-ow news
makes up a larger portion of total return variance.
3 Results
Table 3 measures the extent of active managersand analystsworkloads. For these
active managers, the median load is 40 above-median NYSE capitalization stocks.
For analysts, the median load over this subset of stocks is ve rms. Consequently,
this workload results in typically 16 analysts covering a rm and 37 funds holding
the stock of that rm. Because of the growth of funds over this period, these full-
sample numbers mask a strong trend in the number of funds holding a stock. In the
early part of the sample (1983-1989), the median number of funds holding one of the
above-median NYSE capitalization stocks was nine. In the later part of the sample
(2000-2007), that median number increased to 102.
Our specic interest is how these numbers translate to the number of common
owners or the amount of common coverage for a pair of stocks. We report those
numbers in Table 4. In terms of coverage, it is quite rare to share an analyst with
another rm. In fact, only 5% of all pairs have an analyst in common. In contrast,
it is relatively common to share active fund ownership with another stock as more
than 75% of all stock pairs have a common active fund owner. Typically, a pair
would have roughly seven funds in common. Table 4 shows that the number of
ownership-based connections among above-median NYSE capitalization stocks has
increased dramatically over the period we study. In 1988, the median number of
ownership connections was 3. In 2007, the median number of ownership connections
was 19. Our use of only rank-transformed variables in the analysis is exactly because
of this trend. Figure 1 plots how the average number of common owners in the cross
section of pairs we study has evolved over time. For interpretability, we scale this
measure by the expected number of common owners per pair under the assumptions
that all funds hold the same number of stocks in our sample at a particular point in
time as the average fund at that time. One can see that relative to this benchmark,
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the average number of connections has varied through time but has trended up over
the sample period.
Table 5 Panel A reports the result of our forecasting cross-sectional variation in
realized cross products. We begin by estimating simpler versions of equation (1). In
column (1), we estimate a specication with only common ownership as a forecasting
variable. That variable is highly statistically signicant, with a coe¢ cient of 0.00030
and a t-statistic of 6.11. Recall that the common fund variable has been normalized
to have a standard deviation of one and a mean of zero. Therefore the constant
term, 0.00216, reects the average realized cross product and is a useful benchmark
to understand the economic signicance of our nding. Specically, the coe¢ cient
on common funds indicates that a change of one standard deviation in the degree
of common ownership results in an increase in the forecasted cross product that is
approximately 14% of the average amount of covariation. In column (2) of Table 5
Panel A, we predict covariation using our measure of common ownership and common
coverage, absent any other controls. The coe¢ cient on our measure of common funds
is 0.00027 with a t-statistic of 5.73, only 10% smaller than the estimate in column
(1). Thus there seems to be little correlation in the extent to which F ij;t and A

ij;t
drive cross-sectional variation in comovement. The coe¢ cient on common analyst
coverage, 0.00018, indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the amount
of common analysts results in an increase in comovement of more than 8% of the
average realized covariation. The coverage-based coe¢ cient is also measured quite
precisely with a t-statistic of 7.49.
Being able to forecast di¤erences in comovement using institutional connectedness
may not be surprising if the predictability simply reects the fact that fund managers
and analysts choose to hold stocks that are similar and therefore would be expected
to comove regardless of the common ownership or coverage. For example, growth
managers will tend to hold growth stocks, and previous research has shown that those
types of stocks tend to covary. Therefore, we include four controls for whether the
stocks in the pair are similar. Column (3) of Table 5 Panel A reports the result of
that analysis. Recall that these control variables are normalized to have a standard
deviation of one and transformed (in the case of size, book-to-market, and momentum)
so that higher values indicate greater style similarity. We nd a strong e¤ect for a
one-standard deviation move in industry similarity as the coe¢ cient is 0.00020 with a
t-statistic of 7.30. There is a relatively strong pattern for similarity in book-to-market
as well. The coe¢ cient associated with a one-standard deviation move in similarity
in this style is 0.00012 (t-statistic of 2.78). The similarity in momentum has the same
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one-standard deviation e¤ect on di¤erences in comovement as the similarity in book-
to-market (coe¢ cient of 0.00012), but with a slightly lower t-statistic of 2.28. The
e¤ect on comovement due to size is statistically indistinguishable from zero. More
importantly, the coe¢ cient on common ownership barely changes (0.00024, a drop of
only 0.00003) and remains quite statistically signicant. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient
on common ownership has the strongest one-standard-deviation inuence among the
variables under consideration.
In column (4) of Table 5 Panel A, we estimate the full benchmark specication.
Here we now include very general controls for the size of the stocks in the pair.
All else equal, one might expect that having large stocks in the pair would increase
comovement as these stocks will reect more of the markets movements. More
generally, one might think that size is very important in determining the extent of
institutional ownership of a stock. Though these controls are important in describing
cross-sectional variation in comovement, the institutional connectedness variables are
still quite signicant and in fact the measured coe¢ cients become stronger, with the
coe¢ cient on common ownership doubling in magnitude.6
The nal column of Table 5 Panel A generalizes our controls for stock similarity
by turning to dummy variables to capture the di¤erence in size, beme, or momentum
decile across the pair.7 We also dummy the number of common SIC digits. We
report these dummy coe¢ cient estimates of equation (2) in Panel B of Table 5. The
results show that this exibility appears to be important. For example, the increase
in comovement when a pair goes from having zero to one SIC digit in common is
much more important than going from having two to three SIC digits in common.
Nevertheless, this more exible specication does not a¤ect the coe¢ cient on our
common ownership variable.
In Table 6, we use alternative measures of comovement between two stocks. In
the rst column of Table 6, we repeat the estimates from the fourth column of Table 5
Panel A (our full benchmark specication) for ease of comparison. In column (2), we
keep the same control variables as in the full benchmark specication of Table 5 Panel
A but replace the monthly return cross product with the corrected sum of daily return
6Note that by including these additional size controls, the coe¢ cient on SAME_SIZEij;t
changes sign due to the correlation among the size variables.
7Note that our dummies are for the di¤erence in characteristic deciles across the rms in a pair,
so that ones prior of the sign of the coe¢ cient should be the negative of that in Panel A of the
Table.
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cross products (Srirj =
NP
k=1
ri;krj;k  1N
NP
k=1
ri;k
NP
k=1
rj;k) for the N days within month t+1.
We nd that the coe¢ cient on F ij;t has much more statistical signicance (t-statistic of
9.05) and continues to be quite economically signicant (20% of the average e¤ect, as
estimated by the constant term). The increase in statistical signicance is consistent
with the notion that high-frequency estimates of second moments are more precise.
In columns (3) and (4), we again keep the same control variables as in Table 5 but
replace the monthly return cross product with Pearson and Fisher measures of the
correlation coe¢ cient of the daily returns on stock i and j within month t+1. The
coe¢ cient remains economically large and has a t-statistic over 16 in both cases. This
result conrms that our measure of connectedness forecasts cross-sectional variation
in correlation. Taken together, the results in Table 6 ease concerns of our use of the
realized monthly return cross product (and its components) throughout the rest of
the paper.
To summarize, the main conclusion from Tables 5 and 6 is that institutional
connectedness, whether through common coverage or common ownership, gives eco-
nomically and statistically signicant ability to forecast subsequent comovement. It
is worth noticing that we are only examining in-sample forecasting of cross-sectional
variation in the covariance matrix. However, given that the literature currently con-
cludes that 1/N rules are about the best one can do out-of-sample, it would be inter-
esting to explore how our method and our characteristics perform in out-of-sample
tests such as those in DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2007). Since the characteris-
tics we are using are relatively persistent, we hope that our method and model will
perform relatively well out-of-sample, consistent with the related claims of Brandt,
Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2009).
3.1 Robustness to additional controls and measures of com-
mon ownership
Our regressions have controlled for similarity in characteristics that are known to de-
scribe variation in fund managersinvesting themes. A recent paper by Chen, Chen,
and Li (2009) documents that variables other than similarity in these characteristics
forecast cross-sectional variation in pair-wise correlations. As a further robustness
test, we control for their long list of pair characteristics. In particular, we include
past ve-year monthly return correlation, RETCORRij;t; past protability correla-
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tion, ROECORRij;t; the past correlation in the stocksabnormal trading volume,
V OLCORRij;t; the absolute value of the di¤erence in ve-year log sales growth rates,
DIFFGROWTHij;t; the absolute di¤erence in nancial leverage ratios (dened as
long-term debt / total assets), DIFFLEVij;t; the absolute value of the di¤erence in
the two stockslog share prices, DIFFPRICEij;t; a dummy variable in the two rms
are located in the same state, DSTATEij;t; a dummy variable if the two stocks belong
to the S&P 500 index, DINDEXij;t; and a dummy variable if the two stocks are on the
same stock exchange, DLISTINGij;t. Thus our specication is
yij;t+1 = (3)
[ri;t+1rj;t+1; ij;F isher]
= a+ bf  F ij;t + ba  Aij;t + bs  SAME_SIZEij;t
+bb  SAME_BEMEij;t + bm  SAME_MOMij;t + bk NUM_SICij;t
+bs1  SIZE1ij;t + bs2  SIZE2ij;t + bs12  SIZE1SIZE2ij;t
+bret RETCORRij;t + broe ROECORRij;t + bvol  V OLCORRij;t
+bgrth DIFFGRTHij;t + blev DIFFLEV ij;t + bprice DIFFPRICEij;t
+bstate DSTATEij;t + bindex DINDEXij;t + blisting DLISTINGij;t + "ij;t
where y is either the realized cross product or the realized Fisher return correlation
over the next month.
The rst two regressions in Table 7 repeat the key regressions from Tables 5 and
6 but including these additional controls. In particular, in regression 2 of Table 7,
we reproduce the essence of the main ndings of Chen, Chen, and Li (2009). Stock
pairs with relatively higher past return, protability, or volume correlation have rela-
tively higher return correlation in the future. Stock pairs that are located in the same
state and belong to the same S&P index also have relatively higher return correlation
(In contrast to Chen, Chen, and Li, though we nd that stocks that trade on the
same exchange do tend to have higher return correlation in the future, that e¤ect is
not statistically signicant). Finally, stock pairs that are relatively more similar in
their past sales growth rates, their current share price, or their current leverage ratio
have relatively higher correlation in the future. None of these empirical regulari-
ties subsume our nding that two stocks with relatively higher common ownership
have predictably higher subsequent comovement. We return to the three remaining
columns of Table 7 in the next section.
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Table 8 varies the denition of common ownership for our benchmark specication
(Panel A) and our specication that includes the Chen, Chen, and Li variables (Panel
B). We rst replace the number of common owners, Fij;t, with the total net assets of
all common owners across the two stocks, F TNAij;t . Our next alternative is to measure
common ownership as the total dollar ownership by all common funds of the two stocks
scaled by the total market capitalization of the two stocks, F%CAPij;t . Finally, we use
as our last measure the total dollar ownership by all common funds of the two stocks
scaled by the Total Net Assets of all common owners, F%TNAij;t . In this section, we
focus on the rst two columns of each Panel. All denitions continue to forecast cross-
sectional variation in the realized return cross-product (the rst regression in each
Panel) and the subsequent return correlation (the second regression in each Panel).
Though di¤erences in the relative forecasting ability appear relatively minor, it is
comforting to see that our primary denition consistently has the largest t-statistic
and provides the largest R2. We return to the third column of each Panel in Table
8 in the next section.
3.2 Connectedness and temporary components of returns
Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 document that institutional connectedness helps predict cross-
sectional variation in comovement. The rest of the analysis will focus on exploring
why connecting stocks through common fund ownership matters. A likely explana-
tion is that the e¤ect we nd is consistent with a causal relationship due to price
pressure arising from ows as in Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) and Lou (2009). To
provide additional evidence that this is the case, we rst decompose unexpected
returns into discount-rate news and cash-ow news. Two rms can be correlated
because shocks to their cash-ows move together, because shocks to their discount
rates move together, or because the shocks to the cash-ows of one rm move with
the shocks to the discount-rates of the other rm. What is useful about this de-
composition in this context is that institutions cannot directly a¤ect fundamentals.
Therefore, predicting this portion of the decomposition clearly reects the endoge-
nous choice of institutions. Of course, a higher return covariance arising from higher
covariance between the discount-rate news of the pair is also consistent with plausi-
ble endogeneity-based explanations. For example, rms may tend to hold pairs that
load on a particular priced common factor, not captured by size, book-to-market, or
momentum, whose expected return varies through time. Consider, however, covari-
ation between the cash-ow news of one rm and the discount-rate news of another.
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This covariation predictability seems much more di¢ cult to explain away as simply
reecting the endogenous choice of the fund manager and seems quite more likely to
be due to institutions having a causal role.
The methodology we now follow is very similar to the one described above, but
we change the left hand side of equation 3. Specically, the new equation we estimate
has the form:
yij;t+1 = (4)
[Ni;CFt+1Nj;CFt+1 ; Ni;CFt+1Nj;DRt+1  Nj;CFt+1Ni;DRt+1 ;Ni;DRt+1Nj;DRt+1 ]
= a+ bf  F ij;t + ba  Aij;t + bs  SAME_SIZEij;t
+bb  SAME_BEMEij;t + bm  SAME_MOMij;t + bk NUM_SICij;t
+bs1  SIZE1ij;t + bs2  SIZE2ij;t + bs12  SIZE1SIZE2ij;t
+bret RETCORRij;t + broe ROECORRij;t + bvol  V OLCORRij;t
+bgrth DIFFGRTHij;t + blev DIFFLEVij;t + bprice DIFFPRICEij;t
+bstate DSTATEij;t + bindex DINDEXij;t + blisting DLISTINGij;t + "ij;t
where y is a vector of the various components of the realized return cross-product.
The results of our covariance decomposition can be found in the third, fourth, and
fth regressions of Table 7. In the third regression, we nd that a modest but
statistically signicant proportion of the e¤ect is due to the covariance of cash-ow
news with cash-ow news. For the ownership-based connection, the estimate is a
statistically signicant 0.00010. As argued above, this component must reect the
choices that fund owners make. The fth regression in Table 7 shows that there is
also a statistically signicant but even less economically important relation between
common fund ownership and subsequent covariance between the discount-rate news
of one stock in the pair and the discount-rate news of the other stock in the pair.
The fourth column of Table 7 reports the main nding of this section. Consistent
with the price pressure explanation, common fund ownership has a statistically sig-
nicant relation with the covariation between cash-ow news and discount-rate news
of the stocks in the pair. The measured coe¢ cient is 0.00027, with a t-statistic of
5.59. Note that the average e¤ect is -.00076. Thus for the typical stock pair, the
interaction between cash-ow news for one stock and discount-rate news for the other
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stock tends to reduce return covariance between the stocks in the pair, but for stocks
with common ownership, return covariation is increased.
The nding that the typical interaction between cash-ow news and discount-rate
news across stocks reduces covariance is consistent with the ndings of Vuolteenaho
(2002), who nds that the typical stocks cash-ow news is positively correlated with
its own discount-rate news, reducing rm volatility. Vuolteenaho interprets this
nding as being consistent with a simple story where the typical project is zero NPV.
Given his results, it comes as no surprise that the typical cross-stock e¤ect is negative.
In this context, our nding that the ownership-based component increases covariance
is all the more striking.
Interestingly, the ability of common analyst coverage to forecast subsequent return
covariation mainly arises from the covariation of cash-ow news of one stock with the
cash-ow news of another. The fact that the common coverage institutional connec-
tion works di¤erently than the common ownership institutional connection makes the
price pressure interpretation of the main nding of this section more compelling.
The third regression in each Panel of Table 8 investigates the impact of varying
the denition of our measure of institutional connectedness on the ability of common
ownership to forecast this component of the return covariance. All four measures
appear to be capturing the component of return covariance that is due to the covari-
ance of the discount-rate news of one stock in the pair with the cash-ow news of the
other stock in the pair.
3.3 When does connectedness matter?
To provide additional evidence in support of the causal interpretation, we now exploit
cross-sectional heterogeneity in stock pair characteristics. Specically, in Table 9,
we interact the coe¢ cient on common funds with dummies for the size of the pair of
stocks and the total net ow into the common funds. Specically, each quarter we
sort pairs into quintiles based on their total market capitalization. We independently
sort pairs into quintiles based on their total net ow. We follow the literature in
dening ows (see Coval and Sta¤ord, 2007). Therefore, the net relative investment
ow of funds into fund i in quarter t is dened as:
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FLOWi;t =
TNAi;t   TNAi;t 1  (1 +Ri;t)
TNAi;t 1
(5)
where TNAi;t is the Total Net Assets of fund i in quarter t and Ri;t is the fund
return over the period t   1 to t reported by CRSP Mutual Fund Database. Fund
ows are reported quarterly before 1991 and monthly thereafter. To compute the
quarterly ows, we rst compute the monthly ows, then we sum them up and nally
we divide them by the previous quarter TNA.
Panel A of Table 9 estimates the interaction for the benchmark specication of
Table 5. We nd that common ownership e¤ect on comovement is stronger for pairs
of smaller stocks. In every row, there is a strong decline in the coe¢ cient as we move
to pairs of larger stocks. Moreover, we nd that the common ownership e¤ect on
comovement is strong for low net ows and high net ows. The lowest estimate in
each column always occurs in the fourth row. We generally nd a stronger e¤ect for
inows than for outows, though for the largest pairs, this di¤erence is not statistically
signicant. Figure 2 shows these patterns graphically.
In Panel B of Table 9, we repeat our exercise of interacting the coe¢ cient on F ij;t
with dummies for the pairs location in sorts based on the size of the pair of stocks
and the total net ow into the common funds for the full specication of Table 7.
Consistent with our interpretation, Panel B of Table 9 shows that the cross-sectional
variation in the magnitude of the coe¢ cient documented in Table 9 Panel A also
shows up in the full specication.
3.4 Connected trading strategies
Here we measure the prots to various trading strategies based on our nding that
ownership-based connectedness can be linked to temporary components of returns.
If stock i experiences a negative cash ow shock and connected stock js price also
drops, we conjecture that the drop is due to price pressure, which we expect to revert.
Our trading strategy is thus very simple: we buy (sell) stocks that have gone down
(up) if their connected stocks have gone down (up) as well.
Each month, we sort our subset of stocks into quintiles based on past one-month
return. We independently sort stocks into quintiles based on the past one-month
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return, riC;t, on their portfolio of connected stocks. We use F ij;t to generate the
weights on the connected stocks in the portfolio. Dene
F ij;t = F

ij;t if Fij;t > 0
F ij;t = 0 if Fij;t = 0
Thus the return on the portfolio is riC;t =
JX
j=1
F ij;t 1rj;t
JX
j=1
F ij;t 1
.
We rst consider two simple trading strategies. The rst strategy buys stocks
that are in the low own-return and low connected-return portfolio while selling stocks
that are in the high own-return and high connected-return portfolio. This strategy
uses the connected return as a conrming signal of whether the own stock is under
or overvalued. We interpret such a strategy as exploiting the price pressure induced
by common ownership. The second strategy buys stocks that are in the low own-
return and high connected-return portfolio while selling stocks that are in the high
own-return and low connected-return portfolio. This quite di¤erent bet would be
consistent with a standard pairs trading strategy or with industry momentum. Thus,
the second strategy uses the connected return as a contrarian signal. For each
strategy we generate the cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return by regressing the
t+ 1; t+ 2; :::; t+ 12 returns on the ve-factor model
rp;t+1 rf;t+1 = 5+bRMRFt+1+sSMBt+1+hHMLt+1+mMOMt+1+rSTREVt+1+"p;t+1
where the factors are the four factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart
(1997), augmented with the short-term reversal factor.8 We include this factor as
we are sorting the target stock on its past month return, though we also show results
excluding that factor from our regression.
Figure 3 graphs the cumulative abnormal returns on these two di¤erent trading
strategies. There are two important features of the graph. One, the average abnor-
mal return in the rst month after the sort is signicantly higher when the connected
8All factors are from Ken Frenchs website.
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return is used as a contrarian signal. Two, the cumulative average abnormal buy-
and-hold return is twice as large eight months after the sort when the connected stock
return is used as a conrming signal. These two features are consistent with stocks
being pushed away from fundamental value by mutual-fund trading, with the con-
nected return being a useful measure of the extent of that temporary misvaluation.
Thus, compared to the standard short-term reversal e¤ect, the misvaluation is larger
but takes more time to revert. Figure 4 emphasizes this di¤erence. The trading
strategies are the same as in Figure 3, except that we use the previous three-month
return on a stock and the previous three-month return on the connected portfolio.
The cumulative abnormal buy-and-hold return when the connected return is used as
a conrming signal rather than a contrarian signal is now nearly twice as large.
As a consequence, we evaluate the average returns on portfolio sorts that take
these predictable patterns in the cross section of average returns into account. Table
10 reports the four and ve-factor alphas from independent portfolio sorts based on
the past three-month return on the own stock and the past three-month connected
portfolio return. To further ensure our strategies do not merely reect the standard
one-month reversal e¤ect, we rst skip a month after the sort and then hold the stocks
in question for ve months, following the methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993).
There are two general patterns in Table 10 that are consistent with our initial con-
clusions concerning Figures 3 and 4. Holding the own return constant, as one moves
from high to low connected return, alphas generally increase. Holding the connected
return constant, as one moves from high to low own return, the alphas increase. As
a consequence, we design two composite connected stocks trading strategies that use
the connected return as a conrming signal.
The rst strategy, CS1, buys the low own return / low connected return portfolio
and sells the high own return / high connected return portfolio so that its return is
rCS1 = rlow own = low connected   rhigh own = high connected. The ve-factor alpha for CS1
is an impressive 57 basis points per month with a corresponding t-statistic of 2.95.
The second strategy, CS2, buys the average (across the own return quintiles) low
connected return portfolios and sells the average (across the own return quintiles) high
connected return portfolios so that its return is rCS2 = rlow connected   rhigh connected.
This strategy earns 32 basis points per month, with a t-statistic of 2.60. Though
this strategy ignores the information in the interaction between a stocks own return
and its connected return, the performance is still strong. For completeness, we plot
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the corresponding cumulative abnormal buy-and-hold performance of this strategy in
Figure 5.
Table 11 includes further controls, in particular the liquidity factors of Sadka
(2006) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), a linear time trend, and end-of-quarter
dummies, in the performance attribution of our rst connected stocks trading strategy,
CS1. Though we do nd evidence that CS1 covaries with the liquidity factor of
Pastor and Stambaugh, the abnormal returns on that strategy remain economically
and statistically signicant. Similar conclusions hold for a version of Table 11 (not
shown) analyzing the second connected stocks trading strategy, CS2.
3.5 Hedge Fund Index attribution
Our last analysis uses our two connected stocks trading strategies, CS1 and CS2, in
performance attribution of hedge fund index returns using the CSFB/Tremont Hedge
Fund Indexes. These indexes have been used in a number of studies including Asness,
Krail, and Liew (2001); Agarwal and Naik (2004); Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov
(2003); and Bondarenko (2004). We focus on two particular indexes. The rst
one is the index of all hedge funds. As CFSB weights hedge fund returns by assets
under management and captures more than 85% of all assets under management in
this investing space, this index gives a good representation of the extent to which
our connected stock strategy reects the general health of the hedge fund industry.9
We also examine the performance of the long/short component of the CSFB index to
measure the extent to which funds which specically invest in equities are exposed to
the connected stocks factor.
Table 12 reports the results of this analysis. We nd that hedge funds in general
and long/short managers in particular load negatively on the connected stocks trading
strategy. The coe¢ cient in the rst column of Panel A in Table 12 estimates a
regression of the overall hedge fund index excess return on the return on our rst
connected strategy, rCS1, and the four factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart
(1997), augmented with the short-term reversal factor. The coe¢ cient is -0.0658
with a t-statistic of -2.08. The second column of the Table instead attributes the
performance of the hedge fund index to the connected strategy and the eight hedge
9Note that the CFSB does not include managed accounts or funds of funds in its indexes.
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fund factors of Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2004).10 Though hedge funds in the aggregate
load on these eight factors to various degrees, our connected stocks factor remains
important in describing the returns on hedge funds. The coe¢ cient becomes both
economically and statistically more signicant; the point estimate is now -0.1114 and
has an associated t-statistic of -6.09. Both result suggest that our trading strategy
is useful tool to measure the state of the hedge fund industry.
Perhaps more interesting results are in columns 3 and 4 of Table 12. In column 3,
we measure the degree to which the Long/Short subset of hedge funds covaries with
our connected return trading strategy in the presence of the Fama-French/Carhart
factors and the short-term reversal factor. In column 4, we use the Fung and Hsieh
factors as controls instead. In both cases, we nd that the returns on this subset of
hedge funds strongly negatively covary with our connected return factor with load-
ings that are approximately 25-50% larger in absolute value. The t-statistics are
correspondingly larger. This nding is very comforting as one would expect this
subset of hedge funds to be more exposed to our factor. For comparison, we also
estimate the loading of a value-weight portfolio consisting of all of the active mutual
funds in our sample over the same time period. This portfolio has a smaller (in
absolute value) sensitivity to the connected strategy as the estimate is -0.0265 with
an associated t-statistic of -2.65. Though we do not observe complete holdings data
for all hedge funds and therefore cannot see the exact positions of these long/short
hedge funds, these results suggest that these hedge funds do not take full advantage
of the opportunities that price pressure from mutual fund ows provide. In fact,
one can argue that perhaps hedge funds are exacerbating rather than mitigating the
price pressure patterns documented in this paper. Panel B of Table 12 repeats the
analysis replacing rCS1 with rCS2, the version of our connected strategy that ignores
the information in the interaction between a stocks own return and its connected
return. We nd results that are qualitatively similar. In particular, the loading on
rCS2 is statistically and economically signicant. Additionally, the loading for the
Long/Short subset of hedge funds is again much larger in absolute magnitude.
Figure 6 provides evidence on why it is not surprising that the typical hedge fund
loads negatively on our connected strategy. This gure plots both the loadings of the
two hedge fund indexes on the connected strategies as well as the cumulative abnormal
return on the connected strategy in event time, where the event is the forming of the
connected stock trading strategy (either CS1 or CS2). One reasonable interpretation
10We downloaded three of the Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors from
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls.
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of this gure is that hedge funds follow a momentum strategy that e¤ectively front-
runs mutual funds in distress. However, the typical hedge fund is unable to exit its
positions in time and therefore exacerbates the price dislocation they help initiate.
4 Conclusion
We show that stocks are connected through their common fund ownership. In par-
ticular, pairs of stocks that are connected in this fashion covary more together, con-
trolling for similarity in industry, size, book-to-market equity ratio, and past return
momentum as well as common analyst coverage. We present additional evidence that
suggests the incremental comovement may be causal. First, the e¤ect is stronger for
pairs of relatively smaller stocks and is stronger for pairs whose common owners are
experiencing strong inows or outows. Moreover, the e¤ect ows through the in-
teraction of cash-ow news for one stock with the discount-rate news of the other.
Finally, trading strategies that exploit the fact that temporary price pressure must
eventually revert are quite protable. A trading strategy that uses the return on
the portfolio of stocks that a particular stock is connected to as a conrming signal
generates annual abnormal returns of up to 7%. As a consequence, we provide a
simple way to document the extent to which ownership-based connections result in
equity market contagion. In an application, we document that hedge funds in gen-
eral and an equity-focused subset in particular covary negatively with our trading
strategy (and more so than the mutual funds we originally study), suggesting that
hedge funds on average may be part of the cause of the excess covariation and price
dislocation that contagion from ownership-based connections generates.
5 Appendix
5.1 Decomposing Stock Returns
The price of any asset can be written as a sum of its expected future cash ows,
discounted to the present using a set of discount rates. Campbell and Shiller (1988a,
1988b) develop a loglinear approximate present-value relation that allows for time-
varying discount rates. Campbell (1991) extends the loglinear present-value approach
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to obtain a decomposition of returns:
rt+1   Et rt+1 = (Et+1   Et)
1X
j=0
jdt+1+j   (Et+1   Et)
1X
j=1
jrt+1+j (6)
= NCF;t+1  NDR;t+1;
whered denotes log dividend growth, r denotes log returns, NCF denotes news about
future cash ows (future dividends), and NDR denotes news about future discount
rates (i.e., expected returns). This equation says that unexpected stock returns must
be associated with changes in expectations of future cash ows or discount rates.
5.2 Measuring the components of returns
An important issue is how to measure the shocks to cash ows and to discount rates.
One approach, introduced by Campbell (1991), is to estimate the cash-ow-news and
discount-rate-news series using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. This VAR
methodology rst estimates the terms Et rt+1 and (Et+1 Et)
P1
j=1 
jrt+1+j and then
uses realization of rt+1 and equation (6) to back out cash-ow news. Because of
the approximate identity linking returns, dividends, and stock prices, this approach
yields results that are almost identical to those that are obtained by forecasting cash
ows explicitly using the same information set. Thus the choice of variables to enter
the VAR is the important decision to make when implementing this methodology.
When extracting the news terms in our empirical tests, we assume that the data
are generated by a rst-order VAR model
zt+1 = a+  zt + ut+1, (7)
where zt+1 is a m-by-1 state vector with rt+1 as its rst element, a and   are m-by-1
vector and m-by-m matrix of constant parameters, and ut+1 an i.i.d. m-by-1 vector
of shocks.
Provided that the process in equation (7) generates the data, t+ 1 cash-ow and
discount-rate news are linear functions of the t+ 1 shock vector:
NDR;t+1 = e1
0ut+1; (8)
NCF;t+1 = (e1
0 + e10)ut+1:
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where e1 is a vector with rst element equal to unity and the remaining elements equal
to zeros. The VAR shocks are mapped to news by , dened as    (I    ) 1
so that e10 measures the long-run signicance of each individual VAR shock to
discount-rate expectations.
5.3 Aggregate VAR Specication
In specifying the monthly aggregate VAR, we follow Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004), choosing the same four state variables that they study. The rst element of
our state vector is the excess log return on the market (reM), the di¤erence between
the annual log return on the CRSP value-weighted stock index (rM) and the annual
log riskfree rate, obtained from Professor Kenneth Frenchs website. The second ele-
ment of our state vector is the term yield spread (TY ), provided by Global Financial
Data and computed as the yield di¤erence between ten-year constant-maturity tax-
able bonds and short-term taxable notes, in percentage points. The third variable is
the log smoothed price-earnings ratio (PE), the log of the price of the S&P 500 index
divided by a ten-year trailing moving average of aggregate earnings of companies in
the index, based on data available from Bob Shillers website. As in Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004), we carefully remove the interpolation inherent in Shillers con-
struction of the variable to ensure the variable does not su¤er from look-ahead bias.
Our nal variable is a version of the value spread introduced by Cohen, Polk, and
Vuolteenaho (2003), but for small stocks (V S), which we construct using the data
made available by Professor Kenneth French on his website. The portfolios, which
are constructed at the end of each June, are the intersections of two portfolios formed
on size (market equity, ME) and three portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity
to market equity (BE=ME). As in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), we generate
intermediate values of V S by accumulating total returns on the portfolios in question.
Table 2 Panel A reports the VAR model parameters, estimated using OLS. Each
row of the table corresponds to a di¤erent equation of the VAR. The rst ve columns
report coe¢ cients on the ve explanatory variables: a constant, and lags of the excess
market return, term yield spread, price-earnings ratio, and small-stock value spread.
OLS standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coe¢ cients. The rst
row of Table 2 Panel A shows that all four of our VAR state variables have some
ability to predict monthly excess returns on the aggregate stock market. In our
sample, monthly market returns display momentum; the coe¢ cient on the lagged
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excess market return is a statistically signicant 0.1118 with a t-statistic of 3.52. The
regression coe¢ cient on past values of the term yield spread is positive, consistent
with the ndings of Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell (1987), and Fama and
French (1989), but with a t-statistic of only 1.6. The smoothed price-earnings ratio
negatively predicts the return with a t-statistic of 3.42, consistent with the nding that
various scaled-price variables forecast aggregate returns (Campbell and Shiller, 1988a,
1988b, 2003; Roze¤ 1984; Fama and French 1988, 1989). Finally, the small-stock
value spread negatively predicts the return with a t-statistic of 2.16, consistent with
Brennan, Wang, and Xia (2001), Eleswarapu and Reinganum (2004), and Campbell
and Vuolteenaho (2004). In summary, the estimated coe¢ cients, both in terms of
signs and t-statistics, are consistent with previous research.
The remaining rows of Table 2 Panel A summarize the dynamics of the explanatory
variables. The term spread can be predicted with its own lagged value and the
lagged small-stock value spread. The price-earnings ratio is highly persistent, with
past returns adding some forecasting power. Finally, the small-stock value spread is
highly persistent and approximately an AR(1) process.
5.4 Firm-level VAR Specication
We implement the main specication of our monthly rm-level VARwith the following
three state variables. First, the log rm-level return (ri) is the monthly log value-
weight return on a rms common stock equity. Following Vuolteenaho (2002), to
avoid possible complications with the use of the log transformation, we unlever the
stock by 10 percent; that is, we dene the stock return as a portfolio consisting of 90
percent of the rms common stock and a 10 percent investment in Treasury Bills.
Our second state variable is the momentum of the stock (MOM), which we measure
following Carhart (1997) as the cumulative return over the months t 11 to t 1. Our
nal rm-level state variable is the log book-to-market equity ratio (we denote the
transformed quantity by BM in contrast to simple book-to-market that is denoted
by BE=ME) as of the end of each month t.
We measure BE for the scal year ending in calendar year t  1, and ME (mar-
ket value of equity) at the end of May of year t.11 We update BE=ME over the
11Following Fama and French (1993), we dene BE as stockholdersequity, plus balance sheet
deferred taxes (COMPUSTAT data item 74) and investment tax credit (data item 208) (if available),
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subsequent eleven months by dividing by the cumulative gross return from the end
of May to the month in question. We require each rm-year observation to have
a valid past BE=ME ratio that must be positive in value. Moreover, in order
to eliminate likely data errors, we censor the BE=ME variables of these rms to
the range (.01,100) by adjusting the book value. To avoid inuential observations
created by the log transform, we rst shrink the BE=ME towards one by dening
BM  log[(:9BE + :1ME)=ME].
The rm-level VAR generates market-adjusted cash-ow and discount-rate news
for each rm each month. We remove month-specic means from the state variables
by subtracting rM;t from ri;t and cross-sectional means from MOMi;t and BMi;t. As
in Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010), instead of subtracting the equal-weight
cross-sectional mean from ri;t, we subtract the log value-weight CRSP index return
instead, because this will allow us to undo the market adjustment simply by adding
back the cash-ow and discount-rate news extracted from the aggregate VAR.
After cross-sectionally demeaning the data, we estimate the coe¢ cients of the
rm-level VAR using WLS. Specically, we multiply each observation by the inverse
of the number of cross-sectional observation that year, thus weighting each cross-
section equally. This ensures that our estimates are not dominated by the large cross
sections near the end of the sample period. We impose zero intercepts on all state
variables, even though the market-adjusted returns do not necessarily have a zero
mean in each sample. Allowing for a free intercept does not alter any of our results
in a measurable way.
Parameter estimates, presented in Table 2 Panel B imply that expected returns
are high when past one-month return is low and when the book-to-market ratio and
momentum are high. Book-to-market is the statistically most signicant predic-
tor, while the rms own stock return is the statistically least signicant predictor.
Momentum is high when past stock return and past momentum are high and the
plus post-retirement benet liabilities (data item 330) (if available), minus the book value of preferred
stock. Depending on availability, we use redemption (data item 56), liquidation (data item 10), or par
value (data item 130) (in that order) for the book value of preferred stock. We calculate stockholders
equity used in the above formula as follows. We prefer the stockholdersequity number reported by
Moodys, or COMPUSTAT (data item 216). If neither one is available, we measure stockholders
equity as the book value of common equity (data item 60), plus the book value of preferred stock.
(Note that the preferred stock is added at this stage, because it is later subtracted in the book equity
formula.) If common equity is not available, we compute stockholdersequity as the book value of
assets (data item 6) minus total liabilities (data item 181), all from COMPUSTAT.
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book-to-market ratio is low. The book-to-market ratio is quite persistent. Control-
ling for past book-to-market, expected future book-to-market ratio is high when the
past monthly return is high and past momentum is low.
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Table 1: Number of Stocks, Analysts and Funds Per Year
This table lists the total number of stocks, pairs of stocks, analysts and funds for
every year of the sample period. The sample consists of all NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ
stocks that are above NYSE median capitalization as of the end of each quarter.
We show only the statistics for the last quarter of each year in our sample. The
number of unique stock pairs is n(n 1)
2
, where n is the number of stocks. The fourth
column lists the number of analysts that cover (dened as issuing a one-year earnings
forecast) at least one of the stocks in the sample. The fth column lists the number
of funds that hold at least one of the stocks in the sample.
Year Stocks Pairs Analysts Funds
1983 830 344035 1945 226
1984 824 339076 1987 236
1985 815 331705 1918 260
1986 798 318003 1873 314
1987 803 322003 1981 374
1988 767 293761 1820 400
1989 763 290703 1893 440
1990 801 320400 2110 477
1991 826 340725 1774 542
1992 845 356590 1649 618
1993 851 361675 1715 802
1994 864 372816 1868 922
1995 898 402753 2001 1015
1996 925 427350 2066 1124
1997 923 425503 2232 1280
1998 932 433846 2462 1457
1999 945 446040 2564 1592
2000 900 404550 2873 1742
2001 868 376278 2749 1875
2002 841 353220 2771 1919
2003 856 365940 2723 1914
2004 829 343206 2579 1909
2005 801 320400 2542 1874
2006 758 286903 2471 1754
2007 744 276396 2446 1693
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Table 2: Aggregate and Firm-level VAR
Panel A shows the OLS parameter estimates for a rst-order monthly aggregate VAR
model including a constant, the log excess market return (reM), the term yield spread
(TY ), the log price-earnings ratio (PE), and the small-stock value spread (V S).
Each set of two rows corresponds to a di¤erent dependent variable. The rst ve
columns report coe¢ cients on the ve explanatory variables and the sixth column
reports the corresponding adjusted R2. Standard errors are in parentheses. The
sample period for the dependent variables is December 1928 - May 2009, providing
966 monthly data points. Panel B shows the pooled-WLS parameter estimates for a
rst-order monthly rm-level VAR model. The model state vector includes the log
stock return (r), stock momentum (MOM), and the log book-to-market (BM). We
deneMOM as the cumulative stock return over the last year, but excluding the most
recent month. All three variables are market-adjusted: r is adjusted by subtracting
rM while MOM and BM are adjusted by removing the respective month-specic
cross-sectional means. Rows corresponds to dependent variables and columns to
independent (lagged dependent) variables. The rst three columns report coe¢ cients
on the three explanatory variables and the fourth column reports the corresponding
adjusted R2. The weights used in the WLS estimation are proportional to the inverse
of the number of stocks in the corresponding cross section. Standard errors (in
parentheses) take into account clustering in each cross section. The sample period
for the dependent variables is January 1954 - December 2008, providing 660 monthly
cross-sections and 1,658,049 rm-months.
PANEL A: Aggregate VAR
Variable Constant reM;t TYt PEt V St R
2
reM;t+1 0.0674 0.1118 0.0040 -0.0164 -0.0117 2.81%
(0.0189) (0.0318) (0.0025) (0.0048) (0.0054)
TYt+1 -0.0278 0.0001 0.9212 -0.0051 0.0620 86.40%
(0.0943) (0.1585) (0.0127) (0.0243) (0.0269)
PEt+1 0.0244 0.5181 0.0015 0.9923 -0.003 99.10%
(0.0126) (0.0212) (0.0017) (0.0032) (0.0036)
V St+1 0.0180 0.0045 0.0008 -0.0010 0.9903 98.24%
(0.0169) (0.0283) (0.0022) (0.0043) (0.0048)
PANEL B: Firm-level VAR
Variable ri;t MOMi;t BMi;t R2
ri;t+1 -0.0470 0.0206 0.0048 0.64%
(0.0066) (0.0023) (0.0007)
MOMi;t+1 0.9555 0.9051 -0.0015 91.85%
(0.0052) (0.0018) (0.0007)
BMi;t+1 0.0475 -0.0107 0.9863 97.10%
(0.0050) (0.0017) (0.0011)
Table 3: Ownership, Coverage, and Stock Returns: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the sample dened in Table 1 over the fol-
lowing variables: number of analysts that cover each stock, number of stocks covered
by each analyst, number of funds that hold each stock and number of stocks held
by each fund. We also report summary statistics for the net monthly stock return
(Ri;t), cash ow news (NCF;i;t), discount rate news (NDR;i;t) as well as the cross prod-
ucts of net monthly returns and their components. There are a total of 420,108
analyst-months and 297,312 fund-months. There are 41,374,135 pair-quarters. Sum-
mary statistics are reported for those observations for which values of all variables are
available. Panel A reports these summary statistics for the full sample, while Panels
B, C, and D report summary statistics for the sample by decade.
PANEL A: 1983-2007
Variable Mean Median Std Min Max
Analysts per Stock 17.8 16 10.2 1 68
Stocks per Analyst 6.9 5 7.3 1 95
Funds per Stock 63.8 37 78.9 1 799
Stocks per Fund 55.1 40 61.8 1 1026
Ri;t 0.0113 0.0102 0.1040 -0.9968 2.2663
 NDR;i;t 0.0039 0.0049 0.0539 -0.9106 0.7997
NCF;i;t -0.0033 -0.0021 0.0855 -2.2437 1.2282
Ri;tRj;t 0.0023 0.0002 0.0102 -1.1332 4.6802
Ri;tRi;t 0.0109 0.0028 0.0365 0.0000 5.1363
NDR;i;tNDR;j;t 0.0022 0.0006 0.0015 -0.6131 0.4112
NCF;i;tNCF;j;t 0.0007 0.0001 0.0071 -1.1618 2.2651
 NCF;i;tNDR;j;t -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0056 -1.7364 1.6953
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PANEL B: 1983-1989
Variable Mean Median Std Min Max
Analysts per Stock 19.6 18 12.2 1 63
Stocks per Analyst 8.6 6 9.4 1 95
Funds per Stock 13.4 9 13.7 1 164
Stocks per Fund 39.9 32 32.9 1 433
Ri;t 0.0159 0.0128 0.0931 -0.7614 1.3564
 NDR;i;t 0.0010 0.0003 0.0529 -0.6545 0.7997
NCF;i;t -0.0050 -0.0053 0.0699 -1.0319 0.8077
Ri;tRj;t 0.0026 0.0002 0.0081 -0.3457 1.1692
Ri;tRi;t 0.0089 0.0027 0.0228 0.0000 1.8398
NDR;i;tNDR;j;t 0.0022 0.0007 0.0013 -0.2385 0.1915
NCF;i;tNCF;j;t 0.0005 0.0000 0.0048 -0.3045 0.6535
 NCF;i;tNDR;j;t -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0045 -0.4420 0.5010
PANEL C: 1990-1999
Variable Mean Median Std Min Max
Analysts per Stock 17.3 16 9.4 1 68
Stocks per Analyst 7.4 5 7.8 1 95
Funds per Stock 55.1 40 54.2 1 583
Stocks per Fund 51.8 39 56.9 1 820
Ri;t 0.0138 0.0111 0.1045 -0.8265 2.2663
 NDR;i;t 0.0131 0.0121 0.0478 -0.5696 0.6107
NCF;i;t -0.0060 -0.0044 0.0862 -1.2374 1.2282
Ri;tRj;t 0.0019 0.0002 0.0105 -1.1332 4.6802
Ri;tRi;t 0.0111 0.0029 0.0415 0.0000 5.1363
NDR;i;tNDR;j;t 0.0018 0.0004 0.0014 -0.2125 0.3580
NCF;i;tNCF;j;t 0.0006 0.0000 0.0072 -0.6511 1.3763
 NCF;i;tNDR;j;t -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0052 -0.7384 0.5000
PANEL D: 2000-2007
Variable Mean Median Std Min Max
Analysts per Stock 16.9 16 9.0 1 62
Stocks per Analyst 5.4 4 4.6 1 65
Funds per Stock 129.1 102 98.0 1 799
Stocks per Fund 59.7 43 67.6 1 1026
Ri;t 0.0032 0.0065 0.1140 -0.9968 1.5625
 NDR;i;t -0.0039 0.0004 0.0602 -0.9106 0.6733
NCF;i;t 0.0019 0.0052 0.0994 -2.2437 1.1418
Ri;tRj;t 0.0023 0.0001 0.0122 -1.0351 2.2124
Ri;tRi;t 0.0130 0.0029 0.0421 0.0000 2.4414
NDR;i;tNDR;j;t 0.0027 0.0006 0.0019 -0.6131 0.4112
NCF;i;tNCF;j;t 0.0010 0.0001 0.0094 -1.1618 2.2651
 NCF;i;tNDR;j;t -0.0017 -0.0007 0.0073 -1.7364 1.6953
Table 4: The Cross-sectional Distribution of Common Fund Ownership and
Analyst Coverage
Panel A reports the distribution of the variable Fij;t measuring the number of funds
holding both stocks in a pair over the last quarter. Panel B reports the distribution
of the variable Aij;t measuring the number of analysts forecasting one-year EPS for
both stocks in a pair over the past quarter. The distribution is shown for the average
of all the sample (ALL), for the rst and the last year in the sample (1983 and 2007
respectively), and for every ve years. There are 41,374,135 pair-quarters.
PANEL A: The Cross-sectional Distribution of Common Fund Ownership
FUNDS IN COMMON (Fij;t) Percentiles
Year Mean Std 0% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99% 100%
ALL 9.26 16.97 0 1 3 11 37 76 640
1983 0.74 1.46 0 0 0 1 3 7 52
1985 0.89 1.77 0 0 0 1 4 8 58
1990 2.87 4.63 0 0 1 4 11 21 115
1995 8.14 10.38 0 2 5 11 26 49 231
2000 14.86 21.89 0 4 8 19 47 106 543
2005 22.80 24.35 0 8 15 29 64 120 500
2007 25.73 23.51 0 12 19 32 66 121 463
PANEL B: The Cross-sectional Distribution of Common Analyst Coverage
ANALYSTS IN COMMON (Aij;t) Percentiles
Year Mean Std 0% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99% 100%
ALL 0.24 1.46 0 0 0 0 1 6 53
1983 0.38 1.73 0 0 0 0 2 8 43
1985 0.42 1.86 0 0 0 0 2 9 48
1990 0.39 1.97 0 0 0 0 1 10 53
1995 0.25 1.41 0 0 0 0 1 7 39
2000 0.16 1.07 0 0 0 0 1 4 40
2005 0.16 1.20 0 0 0 0 0 5 43
2007 0.16 1.18 0 0 0 0 0 5 37
36
Table 5: Connected Comovement
This table reports Fama-McBeth estimates of monthly cross-sectional regressions forecasting the
realized cross-product of returns, ri;t+1rj;t+1, for the sample of stocks dened in Table 1. We
estimate
ri;t+1rj;t+1 = a+ bfF ij;t+baAij;t+bsSAME_SIZEij;t+bbSAME_BEMEij;t
+bm  SAME_MOMij;t + bkNUM_SICij;t+bs1SIZE1ij;t
+bs2SIZE2ij;t+bs12SIZE1SIZE2ij;t+"ij;t
The independent variables are updated quarterly and include our main measures of institutional
connectedness, common funds (Fij;t) and common analysts (Aij;t), and a series of controls at time
t: We measure the negative of the absolute value of the di¤erence in size, BE/ME and momentum
percentile ranking across the two stocks in the pair (SAME_SIZEij;t, SAME_BEMEij;t,
and SAME_MOM ij;t respectively). We also measure the number of similar SIC digits,
NUM_SICij;t, for the two stocks in a pair as well as the size percentile of each stock in the
pair and an interaction (SIZE1ij;t, SIZE2ij;t, and SIZE1SIZE2ij;t where stock 1 is always
the larger stock in the pair). All independent variables are then rank transformed and normalized
to have unit standard deviation, which we denote with an asterisk superscript. We report estimates
of regressions using various subsets of these variables in Panel A. For regression (5), we replace the
variables measuring the di¤erence in size, BE/ME, and momentum percentile rankings as well as the
similarity in SIC code across the pair with a full set of dummy variables, which we report in Panel
B. (Note that the dummy variables in Panel B now capture the di¤erence in style across the pair, as
described in the text.) We calculate Newey-West standard errors (four lags) of the Fama-MacBeth
estimates that take into account autocorrelation in the cross-sectional slopes.
PANEL A
Dependent Variable: ri;t+1rj;t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
F ij;t 0.00030 0.00027 0.00024 0.00050 0.00050
( 6.11) ( 5.73) ( 5.64) ( 6.77) ( 6.80)
Aij;t 0.00018 0.00010 0.00013 0.00011
( 7.49) ( 6.20) ( 7.87) ( 9.59)
Constant 0.00216 0.00216 0.00216 0.00217 0.00355
( 8.46) ( 8.46) ( 8.46) ( 8.47) ( 7.89)
SAME_SIZEij;t 0.00002 -0.00028
( 1.17) (-4.77)
SAME_BEMEij;t 0.00012 0.00009
( 2.78) ( 2.30)
SAME_MOMij;t 0.00012 0.00012
( 2.28) ( 2.37)
NUM_SICij;t 0.00020 0.00019
( 7.30) ( 7.02)
SIZE1ij;t 0.00097 0.00075
( 5.51) ( 5.76)
SIZE2ij;t 0.00013 0.00030
( 2.30) ( 4.25)
SIZE1SIZE2ij;t -0.00057 -0.00054
(-4.79) (-4.72)
PANEL B
dummy estimates for specication (5) in Panel A
Variable Value DIFF_SIZEij;t DIFF_BEMEij;t DIFF_MOMij;t NUM_SICij;t
0 -0.00105
(-3.56)
1 0.00003 -0.00010 -0.00028 -0.00062
( 2.34) (-4.03) (-6.02) (-2.24)
2 0.00011 -0.00012 -0.00042 -0.00078
( 3.21) (-3.26) (-5.47) (-3.55)
3 0.00019 -0.00017 -0.00048 0.00040
( 3.48) (-3.14) (-5.38) ( 2.20)
4 0.00025 -0.00022 -0.00052
( 3.50) (-3.28) (-5.09)
5 0.00028 -0.00025 -0.00055
( 3.18) (-3.12) (-4.67)
6 0.00028 -0.00028 -0.00055
( 2.76) (-2.95) (-4.21)
7 0.00028 -0.00033 -0.00052
( 2.32) (-2.90) (-3.43)
8 0.00025 -0.00039 -0.00044
( 1.82) (-2.69) (-2.29)
9 0.00021 -0.00039 -0.00013
( 1.29) (-2.12) (-0.52)
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Table 6: Connected Comovement: Alternative Measures
This table reports Fama-McBeth estimates of monthly cross-sectional regressions forecasting mea-
sures of stock-pair comovement for the sample of stocks dened in Table 1. In particular, we forecast
the realized cross-product of monthly returns, ri;t+1rj;t+1, the corrected sum of squares (Srirj ) us-
ing daily return data in month t+1, as well as the daily return Fisher correlation (Fisher) or the
daily return Pearson correlation (Pearson) realized in month t+1. We estimate
y = a+ bfF ij;t+baAij;t+bsSAME_SIZEij;t+bbSAME_BEMEij;t
+bm  SAME_MOMij;t + bkNUM_SICij;t+bs1SIZE1ij;t
+bs2SIZE2ij;t+bs12SIZE1SIZE2ij;t+"ij;t
where y= [ri;t+1rj;t+1, Srirj , Pearson,Fisher]. The independent variables are updated quarterly
and include our main measures of institutional connectedness, common funds (Fij;t) and common
analysts (Aij;t), and a series of controls at time t: We measure the negative of the absolute value
of the di¤erence in size, BE/ME and momentum percentile ranking across the two stocks in the
pair (SAME_SIZEij;t, SAME_BEMEij;t, and SAME_MOM ij;t respectively). We
also measure the number of similar SIC digits, NUM_SICij;t, for the two stocks in a pair as
well as the size percentile of each stock in the pair and an interaction (SIZE1ij;t, SIZE2ij;t,
and SIZE1SIZE2ij;t). All of these variables are then rank transformed and normalized to have
unit standard deviation, which we denote with an asterisk superscript. We calculate Newey-West
standard errors (four lags) of the Fama-MacBeth estimates that take into account autocorrelation
in the cross-sectional slopes.
Variable ri;t+1rj;t+1 Sxy Pearson Fisher
F ij;t 0.00050 0.00037 0.01806 0.02020
( 6.77) ( 9.05) (16.34) (16.10)
Aij;t 0.00013 0.00010 0.01269 0.01605
( 7.87) ( 5.89) (13.64) (12.77)
Constant 0.00217 0.00185 0.18278 0.20026
( 8.47) ( 8.17) (20.93) (19.74)
SAME_SIZEij;t -0.00028 -0.00007 0.00925 0.01143
(-4.77) (-1.64) ( 6.72) ( 7.36)
SAME_BEMEij;t 0.00009 0.00001 0.00264 0.00319
( 2.30) ( 0.85) ( 5.53) ( 5.75)
SAME_MOMij;t 0.00012 -0.00000 0.00615 0.00724
( 2.37) (-0.30) ( 8.66) ( 8.58)
NUM_SICij;t 0.00019 0.00014 0.00909 0.01096
( 7.02) ( 4.88) (11.99) (11.59)
SIZE1ij;t 0.00097 0.00025 -0.03347 -0.04032
( 5.51) ( 2.60) (-8.07) (-8.44)
SIZE2ij;t 0.00013 0.00007 -0.00582 -0.00634
( 2.30) ( 1.34) (-2.99) (-2.88)
SIZE1SIZE2ij;t -0.00057 -0.00019 0.02160 0.02636
(-4.79) (-2.82) ( 7.80) ( 8.17)
Table 7: Connected Comovement: Additional Controls and Decomposition
This table reports Fama-McBeth estimates of monthly cross-sectional regressions forecasting the real-
ized cross-product of returns, ri;t+1rj;t+1, the daily return Fisher correlation (Fisher), and the cross
products of the return components (cash-ow-news and discount-rate-news), NCF;i;t+1NCF;j;t+1,
 NDR;i;t+1NCF;j;t+1 NDR;j;t+1NCF;i;t+1, and NDR;i;t+1NDR;j;t+1 for the sample of stocks
dened in Table 1. We estimate
y = a+ bfF ij;t+baAij;t+bsSAME_SIZEij;t+bbSAME_BEMEij;t
+bm  SAME_MOMij;t + bkNUM_SICij;t+bs1SIZE1ij;t
+bs2SIZE2ij;t+bs12SIZE1SIZE2ij;t+bret RETCORRij;t
+broe ROECORRij;t++ bvol  V OLCORRij;t + bgrth DIFFGRTHij;t
+blevDIFFLEV ij;t + bprice DIFFPRICEij;t+bstate DSTATEij;t
+bindex DINDEXij;t + blisting DLISTINGij;t + "ij;t
where y= [ri;t+1rj;t+1; Fisher;NCF;i;t+1NCF;j;t+1; NDR;i;t+1NCF;j;t+1 NDR;j;t+1NCF;i;t+1;
NDR;i;t+1NDR;j;t+1]. The return news components are extracted using the return VAR estimates
shown in Table 2 and the methodology documented in the Appendix. We estimate the same
equation as in Table 5, but with additional variables as a robustness check. The additional
variables are constructed as in Chen, Chen, Li (2009) and are as follows: past return correlation,
RETCORRij;t; past protability correlation, ROECORRij;t; the past correlation in the
stocks abnormal trading volume, V OLCORRij;t, the absolute value of the di¤erence in ve-year
log sales growth rates, DIFFGRTH ij;t; the absolute di¤erence in nancial leverage ratios
(dened as long-term debt / total assets), DIFFLEV ij;t; the absolute value of the di¤erence
in the two stocks log share prices, DIFFPRICEij;t; a dummy variable in the two rms are
located in the same state; DSTATEij;t ; a dummy variable if the two stocks both belong to the
S&P 500 index, DINDEXij;t; and a dummy variable if the two stocks are on the same stock
exchange, DLISTINGij;t . All of these variables (except the dummies) are then rank transformed
and normalized to have unit standard deviation, which we denote with an asterisk superscript.
The return components are constructed from the aggregate and rm-level VARs estimated in
Table 2 as described in the Appendix. We calculate Newey-West standard errors (four lags) of the
Fama-MacBeth estimates that take into account autocorrelation in the cross-sectional slopes.
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Variable ri;t+1rj;t+1 Fisher NCF;iNCF;j
 NDR;iNCF;j
 NDR;jNCF;i NDR;iNDR;j
F ij;t 0.00051 0.01080 0.00010 0.00027 0.00002
( 6.44) (11.80) ( 2.82) ( 5.59) ( 2.05)
Aij;t 0.00008 0.01336 0.00011 -0.00004 0.00000
( 5.18) (11.01) ( 8.67) (-3.87) ( 0.94)
Constant 0.00228 0.19159 0.00051 -0.00076 0.00203
( 8.28) (17.09) ( 6.42) (-4.42) ( 8.94)
SAME_SIZEij;t -0.00023 0.01430 -0.00013 -0.00007 -0.00001
(-4.00) ( 9.10) (-3.75) (-1.30) (-0.88)
SAME_BEMEij;t 0.00006 0.00189 0.00007 -0.00004 0.00002
( 1.94) ( 4.13) ( 3.75) (-2.94) ( 5.27)
SAME_MOMij;t 0.00007 0.00456 0.00015 -0.00009 0.00000
( 1.74) ( 6.70) ( 3.95) (-5.80) ( 0.05)
NUM_SICij;t 0.00013 0.00846 0.00008 0.00002 0.00000
( 5.47) ( 9.74) ( 8.38) ( 1.28) ( 2.16)
SIZE1ij;t 0.00081 -0.04500 0.00044 0.00024 0.00005
( 4.81) (-9.11) ( 4.28) ( 1.58) ( 1.25)
SIZE2ij;t 0.00012 -0.00184 0.00002 0.00002 0.00001
( 2.37) (-0.90) ( 0.63) ( 0.51) ( 1.06)
SIZE1SIZE2ij;t -0.00048 0.02815 -0.00024 -0.00018 -0.00003
(-4.28) ( 8.46) (-3.46) (-1.76) (-1.37)
RETCORRij;t 0.00040 0.02369 0.00026 0.00002 0.00004
( 8.02) (13.57) ( 4.44) ( 0.51) ( 4.82)
ROECORRij;t 0.00005 0.00116 0.00002 0.00002 0.00000
( 3.67) ( 3.42) ( 3.24) ( 2.71) ( 1.10)
V OLCORRij;t 0.00005 0.00389 0.00003 0.00001 0.00000
( 3.99) ( 7.12) ( 3.32) ( 0.95) ( 0.35)
DIFFGRTHij;t 0.00016 -0.00217 -0.00006 0.00020 -0.00001
( 5.50) (-2.76) (-3.01) ( 5.95) (-2.13)
DIFFLEV ij;t -0.00002 -0.00319 -0.00000 -0.00001 0.00000
(-1.40) (-6.39) (-0.18) (-1.25) ( 1.79)
DIFFPRICEij;t 0.00007 -0.00592 -0.00002 0.00007 0.00000
( 3.61) (-9.55) (-1.89) ( 3.88) ( 0.84)
DSTATEij;t 0.00049 0.00864 0.00010 0.00029 0.00000
( 5.80) ( 7.69) ( 4.19) ( 4.47) ( 0.56)
DINDEXij;t -0.00024 0.02035 0.00002 -0.00023 0.00003
(-1.68) ( 4.82) ( 0.31) (-1.81) ( 1.48)
DLISTINGij;t -0.00019 0.00310 0.00027 -0.00049 0.00004
(-1.78) ( 1.32) ( 2.18) (-4.16) ( 2.09)
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Table 8: Connected Comovement
This table reports Fama-McBeth estimates of monthly cross-sectional regressions forecasting mea-
sures of stock-pair comovement for the sample of stocks dened in Table 1. In particular, we fore-
cast the realized cross-product of monthly returns, ri;t+1rj;t+1, the daily return Fisher correlation
(Fisher), or  NDR;i;t+1NCF;j;t+1 NDR;j;t+1NCF;i;t+1 realized in month t+1. We estimate
y = a+ bfF ij;t+baAij;t+bsSAME_SIZEij;t+bbSAME_BEMEij;t
+bm  SAME_MOMij;t + bkNUM_SICij;t+bs1SIZE1ij;t
+bs2SIZE2ij;t+bs12SIZE1SIZE2ij;t+bret RETCORRij;t
+broe ROECORRij;t+bgrowth DIFFGROWTHij;t + bstate DSTATEij;t
+blisting DLISTINGij;t + bindex DINDEXij;t + bprice DIFFPRICEij;t
+blevDIFFLEVij;t + bvol  V OLCORRij;t + "ij;t
where y= [ri;t+1rj;t+1;Pearson; NDR;i;t+1NCF;j;t+1 NDR;j;t+1NCF;i;t+1]. The independent
variables are updated quarterly and include our main measures of institutional connectedness, com-
mon funds (Fij;t) and common analysts (Aij;t), and a series of controls at time t: Each row varies
the denition of common ownership for our benchmark specication (Panel A, as in Table 5) and our
specication that includes the Chen, Chen, and Li variables (Panel B, as in Table 7). As measures
of common ownership, we use the number of common owners, Fij;t; the Total Net Assets of all
common owners across the two stocks, F TNAij;t ; the total ownership by all common funds in dollars
of the two stocks scaled by the total market capitalization of the two stocks, F%CAPij;t ; and the total
ownership by all common funds in dollars of the two stocks scaled by the Total Net Assets of all
common owners, F%TNAij;t . All of these variables are then rank transformed and normalized to have
unit standard deviation, which we denote with an asterisk superscript. We calculate Newey-West
standard errors (four lags) of the Fama-MacBeth estimates that take into account autocorrelation
in the cross-sectional slopes.
Panel A: Benchmark Panel B: All
Variable ri;t+1rj;t+1 Fisher
 NDR;iNCF;j
 NDR;jNCF;i ri;t+1rj;t+1 Fisher
 NDR;iNCF;j
 NDR;jNCF;i
F ij;t 0.00047 0.01952 0.00017 0.00050 0.01075 0.00027
( 6.36) (13.95) ( 3.94) ( 6.43) (11.77) ( 5.61)
Avg R2 0.82% 4.60% 1.09% 1.61% 6.40% 2.68%
FTNAij;t 0.00044 0.01138 0.00014 0.00039 0.00516 0.00018
( 6.00) (12.49) ( 3.31) ( 5.80) ( 6.06) ( 5.01)
Avg R2 0.79% 4.34% 1.07% 1.59% 6.36% 2.65%
F%CAPij;t 0.00042 0.01056 0.00018 0.00036 0.00580 0.00020
( 6.83) (13.70) ( 6.31) ( 6.48) ( 7.06) ( 5.69)
Avg R2 0.79% 4.33% 1.04% 1.60% 6.38% 2.66%
F%TNAij;t 0.00029 0.00798 0.00018 0.00026 0.00569 0.00017
( 6.30) (12.25) ( 5.58) ( 6.08) ( 8.71) ( 5.40)
Avg R2 0.70% 4.25% 0.96% 1.53% 6.35% 2.58%
Table 9: Connected Comovement: Cross-sectional Variation
This table reports Fama-McBeth estimates of monthly cross-sectional regressions forecasting the
realized cross-product of returns, ri;t+1rj;t+1, as well as the cross products of the return components,
(NCF;i;t+1)  ( NDR;j;t+1) for the sample of stocks dened in Table 1. We estimate
ri;t+1rj;t+1 = a+
5X
k=1
5X
l=1
bf k;lF ij;t+baAij;t+bsSAME_SIZEij;t+bbSAME_BEMEij;t
+bm  SAME_MOMij;t + bkNUM_SICij;t+bs1SIZE1ij;t
+bs2SIZE2ij;t+bs12SIZE1SIZE2ij;t+bret RETCORRij;t
+broe ROECORRij;t++ bvol  V OLCORRij;t + bgrth DIFFGRTHij;t
+blevDIFFLEVij;t + bstate DSTATEij;t+bindex DINDEXij;t
+bprice DIFFPRICEij;t+blisting DLISTINGij;t + "ij;t
Panel A only considers a subset of these variables that are used in the regression in Table 5. Panel
B estimates the full regressions specication. All of these variables (except the dummies) are then
rank transformed and normalized to have unit standard deviation, which we denote with an asterisk
superscript. In each Panel, we enhance the particular specication by interacting the common fund
variable with dummies for the ranking of the pair based on quarterly independent sorts (as of time
t) on the pairs total market capitalization (k dimension of bf k;l) and the total fund ows of the
common funds (l dimension of bf k;l). We calculate Newey-West standard errors (four lags) of the
Fama-MacBeth estimates that take into account autocorrelation in the cross-sectional slopes.
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PANEL A: Dependent var: ri;t+1rj;t+1
Benchmark controls of Table 5 included but not shown
bf k;l estimates Size of the pair (k)
Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Low 0.00081 0.00075 0.00065 0.00051 0.00046 0.00034
( 4.50) ( 5.30) ( 5.85) ( 5.67) ( 5.05) ( 2.54)
Total 2 0.00063 0.00059 0.00054 0.00043 0.00041 0.00022
net ( 4.99) ( 5.45) ( 5.43) ( 4.98) ( 4.78) ( 2.96)
ow 3 0.00068 0.00066 0.00061 0.00049 0.00045 0.00023
from ( 4.28) ( 4.60) ( 4.70) ( 4.50) ( 4.33) ( 2.51)
common 4 0.00065 0.00058 0.00055 0.00042 0.00035 0.00029
funds ( 5.91) ( 6.20) ( 6.93) ( 6.20) ( 5.17) ( 4.37)
High 0.00119 0.00097 0.00074 0.00060 0.00048 0.00071
( 5.99) ( 5.74) ( 6.57) ( 6.18) ( 5.59) ( 4.71)
Low - 3 0.00013 0.00009 0.00004 0.00002 0.00002
( 0.78) ( 0.77) ( 0.40) ( 0.29) ( 0.39)
High - 3 0.00051 0.00030 0.00014 0.00010 0.00003
( 3.53) ( 2.27) ( 1.66) ( 1.38) ( 0.57)
PANEL B: Dependent var: ri;t+1rj;t+1
All controls of Table 7 included but not shown
bf k;l estimates Size of the pair (k)
Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Low 0.00077 0.00077 0.00069 0.00057 0.00050 0.00027
( 4.70) ( 5.29) ( 5.84) ( 5.81) ( 5.47) ( 1.93)
Total 2 0.00060 0.00059 0.00057 0.00049 0.00046 0.00014
net ( 5.47) ( 6.27) ( 6.15) ( 5.93) ( 5.54) ( 1.64)
ow 3 0.00064 0.00062 0.00059 0.00052 0.00049 0.00016
from ( 5.25) ( 5.94) ( 5.97) ( 5.51) ( 5.00) ( 1.90)
common 4 0.00064 0.00058 0.00059 0.00050 0.00043 0.00021
funds ( 7.07) ( 8.17) ( 8.49) ( 7.55) ( 6.13) ( 3.37)
High 0.00120 0.00100 0.00081 0.00070 0.00057 0.00063
( 5.95) ( 6.10) ( 7.02) ( 6.39) ( 5.53) ( 4.42)
Low - 3 0.00013 0.00015 0.00010 0.00005 0.00002
( 0.92) ( 1.36) ( 1.42) ( 1.07) ( 0.53)
High - 3 0.00056 0.00038 0.00022 0.00018 0.00008
( 3.88) ( 3.12) ( 3.38) ( 2.74) ( 1.97)
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Table 10: Alphas on Connected Trading Strategies
This table presents the protability of a simple trading strategy exploiting stock connectedness. We
independently sort stocks into quintiles based on their own return over the last three months and the
return on their connected portfolio over the last three months. We measure the connected return as
riC;t=
JX
j=1
F ij;t 1rj;t=
JX
j=1
F ij;t 1 where F

ij;t= F

ij;t if Fij;t> 0 and F

ij;t= 0 if Fij;t= 0. Each
portfolio holds the associated stocks for the next ve months. We estimate coe¢ cients from monthly
regressions of
rp;t rf;t= 5+bRMRF t+sSMBt+hHMLt+mMOM t+rSTREV t+"p;t
where rp;t is the equal-weight excess return on the portfolio of the stocks associated with the
particular trading strategy. Panel A reports alphas where the factor STREV is excluded from
the regression and Panel B reports 5. In each panel, we also report the average returns on 1) a
connected strategy, CS1, which buys the low own return / low connected return portfolio and sells
the high own return / high connected return portfolio and 2) a second connected strategy, CS2,
which buys the average (across the own return quintiles) low connected return portfolios and sells
the average (across the own return quintiles) high connected return portfolios.
PANEL A: FOUR FACTOR ALPHAS
Connected portfolio
Low 2 3 4 High L - H Avg L-H
Low 0.0041 0.0045 0.0038 0.0028 0.0007 0.0034
(2.94) (3.83) (3.26) (2.26) (0.55) (1.84)
2 0.0050 0.0035 0.0025 0.0024 0.0008 0.0042
Own (4.11) (3.85) (2.90) (2.53) (0.72) (2.94)
Return 3 0.0031 0.0018 0.0010 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0030 0.0033
(2.81) (2.02) (1.22) (-.06) (0.10) (2.28) (2.66)
4 0.0024 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0013 0.0037
(1.97) (-.42) (-1.1) (-1.7) (-1.5) (2.65)
High 0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0018 0.0021
(0.20) (-.79) (-3.0) (-2.7) (-1.6) (1.27)
L - H 0.0039 0.0053 0.0064 0.0054 0.0026 0.0060
(2.54) (3.92) (4.47) (3.84) (1.64) (3.10)
PANEL B: FIVE FACTOR ALPHAS
Connected portfolio
Low 2 3 4 High L - H Avg L-H
Low 0.0038 0.0041 0.0034 0.0022 0.0005 0.0034
(2.71) (3.50) (2.90) (1.77) (0.36) (1.79)
2 0.0049 0.0033 0.0023 0.0021 0.0005 0.0044
Own (4.02) (3.60) (2.63) (2.23) (0.49) (3.05)
Return 3 0.0028 0.0015 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0030 0.0032
(2.55) (1.69) (0.88) (-.34) (-.16) (2.24) (2.60)
4 0.0022 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0016 0.0039
(1.80) (-.83) (-1.5) (-1.9) (-1.9) (2.73)
High -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0019 0.0016
(-.22) (-1.4) (-3.3) (-2.8) (-1.7) (0.99)
L - H 0.0041 0.0055 0.0062 0.0048 0.0024 0.0057
(2.66) (4.03) (4.31) (3.43) (1.50) (2.95)
Table 11: The Connected Strategy and Liquidity Risk
This table measures the loadings of the connected stock trading strategy on two common liquidity fac-
tors as well as on time e¤ects. We study the connected strategy,CS1, formed in Table 10, which buys
the low own return / low connected return portfolio and sells the high own return / high connected
return portfolio so that its return is rCS1= rlow own = low connected rhigh own = high connected. We
regress rCS1 on a constant, liquidity factors from the work of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003),
PS_INNOV , and Sadka (2006), SADKA_PV , the Fama-French/Carhart factors, a short-
term reversal factor, a trend, and seasonal (quarterly) dummies. Columns 1 and 2 report loadings
of our connected strategy on both liquidity factors for the period March 1983 to December 2005
(Sadkas liquidity factor is only available during that period). Columns 3 to 5 include the PS liq-
uidity factor, a trend, and quarterly seasonal dummies as additional explanatory variables, over the
period June 1980 to December 2008.
Dependent Variable: Connected Strategy
1 2 3 4 5 6
Alpha 0.0063 0.0063 0.0062 0.0063 0.0107 0.0109
(3.30) (3.28) (2.87) (3.28) (2.95) (3.02)
PS_INNOV 0.0638 0.0630 0.0708
(2.03) (2.00) (2.23)
SADKA_PV 0.3564
(0.95)
RMRF -0.0081 -0.0377 0.0350 -0.0392 -0.0048 -0.0372
(-0.16) (-0.75) (0.63) (-0.78) (-0.10) (-0.74)
SMB -0.3664 -0.3711 -0.4150 -0.3707 -0.3501 -0.3549
(-5.97) (-6.07) (-6.22) (-6.05) (-5.61) (-5.71)
HML -0.1797 -0.1907 -0.1208 -0.1920 -0.1621 -0.1746
(-2.53) (-2.69) (-1.50) (-2.70) (-2.24) (-2.42)
UMD -1.0164 -1.0132 -1.0120 -1.0136 -1.0191 -1.0164
(-22.32) (-22.34) (-20.29) (-22.31) (-22.34) (-22.41)
ST_Reversal 0.0164 0.0218 0.0398 0.0215 0.0201 0.0255
(0.28) (0.37) (0.62) (0.37) (0.34) (0.44)
Trend 0.0000
(-0.44)
Q1 -0.0065 -0.0064
(-1.24) (-1.22)
Q2 -0.0087 -0.0099
(-1.70) (-1.94)
Q3 -0.0029 -0.0027
(-0.56) (-0.53)
Obs 343 343 274 343 343 343
R2 65% 66% 67% 66% 66% 66%
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Table 12: Hedge Fund and Mutual Fund Exposure to the Connected Strat-
egy
This table measures the exposure of two CSFB hedge fund return indexes (all and long/short)
as well as the value-weight average active mutual fund return (net of fees) to the connected
strategy described in Table 10. We regress fund index returns in excess of the t-bill re-
turn on a constant, the connected strategy and either the eight Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2004)
hedge fund factors or the Fama-French/Carhart model plus a short-term reversal factor. The
time period is January 1994 to December 2008. Panel As analysis uses as the additional ex-
planatory variable the connected strategy (CS1) in Table 10 that buys the low own return
and low connected return portfolio and sells the high own return and high connected return
(rCS1= rlow own = low connected rhigh own = high connected). Panel Bs analysis uses as the addi-
tional explanatory variable the connected strategy (CS2) in Table 10 that buys the average (across
the own-return quintiles) low connected return portfolio and sells the average (across the own-return
quintiles) high connected return (rCS2=rlow connected rhigh connected).
PANEL A: CS1
HF ALL HF LONG/SHORT MF ALL (vw)
Alpha 0.0020 0.0022 0.0026 0.0012 -0.0013
(1.70) (2.06) (2.73) (1.09) (-3.56)
rCS1 -0.0658 -0.1114 -0.0817 -0.1707 -0.0265
(-2.08) (-6.09) (-3.14) (-9.44) (-2.65)
RMRF 0.3794 0.5097 0.9934
(13.07) (21.34) (108.3)
SMB 0.0852 0.1498 0.0562
(2.31) (4.95) (4.84)
HML 0.0850 -0.0558 -0.0044
(2.16) (-1.72) (-0.35)
UMD 0.0761 0.1223 -0.0071
(1.84) (3.60) (-0.54)
ST Reversal -0.0492 -0.0820 -0.0232
(-1.67) (-3.38) (-2.50)
Bond-trend -0.0226 -0.0084
(-2.96) (-1.11)
Currency-trend 0.0113 0.0050
(1.93) (0.86)
Commodity-trend 0.0131 0.0028
(1.63) (0.35)
Equity Market 0.1965 0.4140
(4.97) (10.59)
Size Spread 0.0629 0.2172
(1.88) (6.56)
Bond Market -0.1235 -0.0090
(-3.41) (-0.25)
Credit Spread -0.1816 0.0429
(-3.33) (0.79)
Emerging Market 0.0829 0.0897
(3.55) (3.89)
Obs 173 164 173 164 173
R2 56% 60% 82% 76% 99%
PANEL B: CS2
HF ALL HF LONG/SHORT MF ALL (vw)
Alpha 0.0019 0.0025 0.0024 0.0015 -0.0014
(1.62) (2.16) (2.47) (1.29) (-3.89)
rCS2 -0.1158 -0.1793 -0.0943 -0.2649 0.0006
(-2.36) (-4.44) (-2.30) (-6.24) (0.03)
RMRF 0.3761 0.5071 0.9934
(12.99) (20.96) (106.2)
SMB 0.0759 0.1564 0.0698
(2.01) (4.98) (5.75)
HML 0.0815 -0.0523 0.0016
(2.07) (-1.59) (0.12)
UMD 0.1015 0.1726 0.0209
(3.31) (6.74) (2.11)
ST Reversal -0.0528 -0.0854 -0.0236
(-1.80) (-3.48) (-2.49)
Bond-trend -0.0244 -0.0114
(-3.07) (-1.36)
Currency-trend 0.0097 0.0027
(1.60) (0.41)
Commodity-trend 0.0149 0.0058
(1.78) (0.66)
Equity Market 0.1834 0.3911
(4.43) (9.00)
Size Spread 0.0723 0.2347
(2.04) (6.32)
Bond Market -0.1078 0.0128
(-2.79) (0.31)
Credit Spread -0.1442 0.0982
(-2.51) (1.62)
Emerging Market 0.0811 0.0880
(3.31) (3.42)
Obs 173 164 173 164 173
R2 56% 57% 81% 71% 99%
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Figure 1: This gure plots the time-series evolution of the ratio of the average number
of common funds per pair in each cross section of stock pairs to the average number
of common funds per pair if all funds in that cross section held the same number of
stocks as the average fund holds.
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Figure 2: This gure plots the point estimates from Table 9 Panel A. In that table we
interact the coe¢ cient on the number of common funds per pair with dummies for the
size of the pair of stocks and the total net ow into the common funds. Specically,
each quarter we sort pairs into quintiles based on their total market capitalization.
We independently sort pairs into quintiles based on their total net ow. Thus the
interactions reect the cross-sectional variation in stock-pair heterogeneity.
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Figure 3: This gure graphs the abnormal performance of buy-and-hold strategies
that trade the one-month reversal strategy conditional on the return on a stocks
connected portfolio. Stocks are sorted into 25 portfolios based on independent quin-
tile sorts on a stocks own one-month return and its one-month connected return.
The top half of the gure buys (sells) stocks whose own returns are relatively low
(high) and whose connected returns are relatively low (high). The bottom half of
the gure buys (sells) stocks whose own returns are relatively low (high) and whose
connected returns are relatively high (low). The left side of the gure benchmarks
returns against the Fama-French/Carhart four-factor model while the right side of
the gure benchmarks returns against the Fama-French/Carhart model augmented
with the one-month reversal factor.
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Figure 4: This gure graphs the abnormal performance of buy-and-hold strategies
that trade a three-month reversal strategy conditional on the return on a stocks
connected portfolio. Stocks are sorted into 25 portfolios based on independent quin-
tile sorts on a stocks own three-month return and its three-month connected return.
The top half of the gure buys (sells) stocks whose own returns are relatively low
(high) and whose connected returns are relatively low (high). The bottom half of
the gure buys (sells) stocks whose own returns are relatively low (high) and whose
connected returns are relatively high (low). The left side of the gure benchmarks
returns against the Fama-French/Carhart four-factor model while the right side of
the graphs benchmarks returns against the Fama-French/Carhart model augmented
with the one-month reversal factor.
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Figure 5: This gure graphs the abnormal performance of buy-and-hold strategies
that trade a one- and three-month reversal strategy based solely on the return on
a stocks connected portfolio. Stocks are sorted into 25 portfolios based on inde-
pendent quintile sorts on a stocks own and connected one-month (top two gures)
or three-month (bottom two gures) returns. Each graph buys (sells) the average
(across the own return quintiles) low (high) connected return portfolios. The left
two graphs in the gure benchmark returns against the Fama-French/Carhart four-
factor model while the right two graphs in the gure benchmark returns against the
Fama-French/Carhart model augmented with the one-month reversal factor.
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Figure 6: This gure plots the loadings of hedge fund returns on the connected
strategy in event time as well as the cumulative ve-factor abnormal return. The
top graph denes the connected strategy, CS1, which buys the low own return /
low connected return portfolio and sells the high own return / high connected return
portfolio so that its return is rCS1 = rlow own = low connected rhigh own = high connected. The
second graph uses as the connected strategy, CS2, which buys the average (across
the own return quintiles) low connected return portfolios and sells the average (across
the own return quintiles) high connected return portfolios so that its return is rCS2 =
rlow connected   rhigh connected.
